Abstract. Let ML( u + ) denote the fragment of modal logic extended with the universal modality in which the universal modality occurs only positively. We characterize the definability of ML( u + ) in the spirit of the well-known Goldblatt-Thomason-Theorem. We show that an elementary class F of Kripke frames is definable in ML( u + ) if and only if F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes. In addition, we initiate the study of modal frame definability in team-based logics. We show that, with respect to frame definability, the logics ML( u + ), modal logic with intuitionistic disjunction, and (extended) modal dependence logic all coincide. Thus we obtain Goldblatt-Thomason-style theorems for each of the logics listed above.
Introduction
Modal logic as a field has progressed far from its philosophical origin, e.g, from the study of the concepts of necessity and possibility. Modern modal logics are integral parts of both theoretical research and real life applications in various scientific fields such as mathematics, artificial intelligence, linguistics, economic game theory, and especially in many subfields of theoretical and applied computer science. Indeed, the general framework of modal logic has been found to be remarkably adaptive.
During the last decade there has been an emergence of vibrant research on modal and propositional logics with team semantics. The fundamental idea behind team semantics is crisp. The idea is to shift from points to sets of points as the satisfying elements of formulae. In ordinary Kripke semantics for modal logic, the formulae are evaluated on pointed models (M, w), where M is a Kripke model and w is an element of the domain of M. In team semantics for modal logic the formulae are evaluated on pairs (M, T ), where M is an ordinary Kripke model and the set T , called a team of M, is a subset of the domain of M. This shift in semantics has no real effect if we only consider standard modal logic. The significance of this shift can be only seen once we extend modal logic with (a collection of) novel atomic formulae that state properties of teams.
In recent years multitude of different extensions of modal logic with novel atomic propositions on teams have been defined. The first of this kind was the modal dependence logic (MDL) of Väänänen [20] . Modal dependence logic extends modal logic with propositional dependence atoms. A dependence atom, denoted by dep(p 1 , . . . , p n , q), intuitively states that (inside a team) the truth value of the proposition q is functionally determined by the truth values of the propositions p 1 , . . . , p n . It was soon realized that MDL lacks the ability to express temporal dependencies; there is no mechanism in MDL to express dependencies that occur between different points of the model. This is due to the restriction that only proposition symbols are allowed in the dependence atoms of modal dependence logic. To overcome this defect Ebbing et al. [6] introduced the extended modal dependence logic (EMDL) by extending the scope of dependence atoms to arbitrary modal formulae, i.e., dependence atoms in extended modal dependence logic are of the form dep(ϕ 1 , . . . ϕ n , ψ), where ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ are formulae of modal logic. Subsequently multitude of related logics have been introduced.
The focus of the research on team-based logics has been in the computational complexity and expressive power. Hella et al. [11] established that exactly the properties of teams that are downward closed and closed under the so-called team k-bisimulation, for some finite k, are definable in EMDL. In the article it was also shown that the expressive powers of EMDL and ML( ) (modal logic extended with intuitionistic disjunction) coincide. More recently Kontinen et al. have shown (in the manuscript [13] ) that exactly the properties of teams that are closed under the team k-bisimulation are definable in the so-called modal team logic. These characterization truly demonstrate the naturality of the related languages. For recent research related to computational complexity of modal dependence logics see, e.g., [6, 7, 12, 14, 15, 19] . The research related to proof theory has been less active, for related work see the PhD thesis [21] and the manuscript [17] .
Modal logic extended with universal modality (ML( u )) was first formulated by Goranko and Passy [10] . It extends modal logic by a novel modality u , called the universal modality, with the following semantics: the formula u ϕ is true in a point w of a model M if ϕ is true in every point v of the model M. In this article we identify a connection between particular team-based modal logics and a fragment of ML( u ). We will then use this connection in order characterize frame definability of these team-based modal logics in the spirit of the well-known Goldblatt-Thomason Theorem.
The celebrated Goldblatt-Thomason Theorem [9] is a characterization of modal definability of elementary (i.e., first-order definable) classes of Kripke frames by four frame constructions: generated subframes, disjoint unions, bounded morphic images, and ultrafilter extensions. The theorem states that an elementary class of Kripke frames if definable by a set of modal formulae if and only if the class is closed under taking generated subframes, disjoint unions and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions. The original proof of Goldblatt and Thomason was algebraic. A model-theoretic version of the proof was later given by van Benthem [2] . From then on, Goldblatt-Thomason-style Theorems have been formulated for numerous extensions of modal logic such as modal logic with the universal modality [10] , difference logic [8] , hybrid logic [4] , and graded modal logic [16] .
This paper initiates the study of frame definability in the framework of team semantics. Our contribution is two-fold. Firstly, we give a Goldblatt-Thomasonstyle Theorem for a fragment of modal logic extended with universal modality. Secondly, we show that there is a surprising connection between this fragment and particular team-based modal logics. Let ML( u + ) denote the syntactic fragment of ML( u ) in which the universal modality occurs only positively. We show that an elementary class of Kripke frames is definable in ML( u + ) if and only if it is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes. We then show that a class of frames is definable in ML( u + ) if and only it is definable in ML( ). We then continue by showing that, with respect to frame definability, MDL and EMDL coincide. From this observation and since, by the work of Hella et al. [11] , the expressive powers of ML( ) and EMDL coincide, the above characterization of frame definability also holds for ML( ), MDL, and EMDL.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a short introduction to modal logic extended with the universal modality and prove a normal form for ML( u + ). In Section 3 we first introduce the concept of frame definability. We then show that, with respect to frame definability, ML, ML( u + ), and ML( u ) form a strict hierarchy. In Section 4 we give a Goldblatt-Thomason -style characterization for the frame definability of ML( u + ). In Section 5 we introduce the team-based logics MDL, EMDL, and ML( ). We then show that, with respect to frame definability, ML( ), MDL, EMDL, and ML( u + ) coincide.
Modal Logic with Universal Modality
The syntax of modal logic with universal modality could be defined in any standard way. However in logics with team semantics, it is customary to assume that all formulae are in negation normal form, i.e., negations occur only in front of atomic propositions. In Section 5 we compare modal logic with universal modality to different logics with team semantics. In order to make these comparisons more straightforward, we define the syntax of standard modal logic also in negation normal form.
Let Φ be a set of atomic propositions. The set of formulae for modal logic ML(Φ) is generated by the following grammar
The syntax of modal logic with universal modality ML( u )(Φ) is obtained by extending the syntax of ML(Φ) by the grammar rules
The syntax of modal logic with positive universal modality ML( u + )(Φ) is obtained by extending the syntax of ML(Φ) by the grammar rule ϕ ::= u ϕ. As usual, if the underlying set Φ of atomic propositions is clear from the context, we drop "(Φ)" and just write ML, ML( u ), etc. We also use the shorthands ¬ϕ, ϕ → ψ, and ϕ ↔ ψ. By ¬ϕ we denote the formula that can be obtained from ¬ϕ by pushing all negations to the atomic level, and by ϕ → ψ and ϕ ↔ ψ, we denote ¬ϕ ∨ ψ and (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ), respectively.
A (Kripke) frame is a pair F = (W, R) where W , called the domain of F, is a non-empty set and R ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation on W . By F all , we denote the class of all frames. We use |F| to denote the domain of the frame F. A (Kripke) Φ-model is a tuple M = (W, R, V ), where (W, R) is a frame and V : Φ → P(W ) is a valuation of the proposition symbols. The semantics of modal logic, i.e., the satisfaction relation M, w ϕ, is defined via pointed Φ-models as usual. For the universal modality u and its dual ♦ u , we define
If ϕ ∈ ML( u )(Φ) is a Boolean combination of formulae beginning with u , we say that ϕ is closed. A formula set Γ is valid in a model M = (W, R, V ) (notation: M Γ ), if M, w ϕ holds for every w ∈ W and every ϕ ∈ Γ . When Γ is a singleton { ϕ }, we simply write M ϕ. We say that formulae ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are equivalent in Kripke semantics (
We will next define a normal form for ML( u + ). This normal form is a modification of the normal form for ML( u ) by Goranko and Passy in [10] .
if there exists a natural number n ∈ ω and formulae ψ, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ∈ ML
It is easy to show that for each ML( u + )-formula in conjunctive u -form there exists an equivalent ML( u + )-formula in disjunctive u -form, and vice versa. The proof of the following theorem can be found in Appendix A (Theorem A.1).
Modal Frame Definability
In this section, we first introduce the basic notions and results concerning frame definability used later on in the paper. We will then compare ML, ML( u + ), and ML( u ) with respect to frame definability.
Below we assume only that the logics L and L are such that the global satisfaction relation for Kripke models (i.e., M ϕ) is defined. A set Γ of Lformulae is valid in a frame F (written: F Γ ) if (F, V ) ϕ for every valuation V : Φ → P(W ) and every ϕ ∈ Γ . A set Γ of L-formulae is valid in a class F of frames (written:
We say that Γ defines the class FR(Γ ). When Γ is a singleton { ϕ }, we simply say that ϕ defines the class FR(Γ ). A class F of frames is L-definable if there exits a set Γ of L-formulae such that FR(Γ ) = F. Definition 2. A class C ⊆ F all is elementary if there exists a set of first-order sentences with equality of the vocabulary {R} that defines C.
It is easy to see that ML ≤ F ML( u + ) ≤ F ML( u ). To show that the two occurrences of ≤ F here are strict, let us introduce two frame constructions.
Definition 4 (Disjoint Unions). Let { F i | i ∈ I } be a pairwise disjoint family of frames, where
Definition 5 (Generated Subframes). Given any two frames F = (W, R) and
2 , (iii) w Rv implies v ∈ W , for every w ∈ W . We say that F is the generated subframe of F by X ⊆ |F| (notation: F X ) if F is the smallest generated subframe of F whose domain contains X. F is a finitely generated subframe of F if there is a finite set X ⊆ |F| such that F is F X .
It is well-known that every ML-definable frame class is closed under taking both disjoint unions and generated subframes (see [3, Theorem 3.14 (i), (ii)]). However this is not the case for every ML( u )-definable class, see Example A.1 in Appendix A.
Recall that a closed disjunctive u -clause is a formula of the form i∈I u ϕ i , where, for each i ∈ I, ϕ i ∈ ML. Definition 6. We denote by u ML the set of all closed disjunctive u -clauses.
The following proposition follows directly by Propositions A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A. Proposition 1. Every ML( u + )-definable frame class is closed under taking generated subframes. Now since, by Example A.1 ML( u + ) is not closed under taking disjoint unions and ML( u ) is not closed under generated submodels, and since by Proposition A.2 ML( u + ) = F u ML, the following strict hierarchy follows.
. Moreover, the same holds when we restrict ourselves to elementary frame classes.
4 Goldblatt-Thomason-style Theorem for ML( u + )
In addition to disjoint unions and generated subframes, we introduce two more frame constructions. With the help of these four constructions, we first review the existing characterizations of ML-and ML( u )-definability when restricted to the elementary frame classes. We then give a novel characterization of ML( u + )-definability again restricted to the elementary frame classes.
Definition 7 (Bounded Morphism). Given any two frames F = (W, R) and F = (W , R ), a function f : W → W is a bounded morphism if is satisfies the following two conditions:
If f is surjective, we say that F is a bounded morphic image of F.
Definition 8 (Ultrafilter Extensions)
. Let F = (W, R) be a Kripke frame, and Uf(W ) denote the set of all ultrafilters on W . Define the binary relation R ue on the set Uf(W ) as follows: UR ue U iff X ∈ U implies m R (X) ∈ U, for every X ⊆ W , where m R (X) := { w ∈ W | wRw for some w ∈ X }. The frame ueF = (Uf(W ), R ue ) is called the ultrafilter extension of F.
A frame class F reflects ultrafilter extensions if ueF ∈ F implies F ∈ F for every frame F. It is well-known that every ML-or ML( u )-definable frame class is closed under taking bounded morphic images and reflects ultrafilter extensions (cf. [3, Theorem 3.14, Corollary 3.16 and Exercise 7.
1.2]).
Theorem 2 (Goldblatt-Thomason Theorems for ML [9] & ML( u ) [10] ). (i) An elementary frame class is ML-definable if and only if it is closed under taking bounded morphic images, generated subframes, disjoint unions and reflects ultrafilter extensions.
(ii) An elementary frame class is ML( u )-definable if and only if it is closed under taking bounded morphic images and reflects ultrafilter extensions.
In order to characterize ML( u + )-definability of elementary frame classes, we need to introduce the following notion of reflection of finitely generated subframes: a frame class F reflects finitely generated subframes whenever it is the case for all frames F that, if every finitely generated subframe of F is in F, then F ∈ F.
4 The fact that every ML( u + )-definable class reflects finitely generated subframes follows by Propositions 2 and A.4 (in Appendix A).
Proposition 3. Every ML( u + )-definable class of Kripke frames reflects finitely generated subframes.
Whereas the original Goldblatt-Thomason Theorem for basic modal logic was proved via duality between algebras and frames [9] , our proof of GoldblattThomason-style Theorem modifies the model-theoretic proof given by van Benthem [2] for basic modal logic. The proof of the following theorem can be found in Appendix B (Theorem B.1).
Theorem 3. Given any elementary frame class F, the following are equivalent:
(ii) F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes.
Frame Definability in Logics with Team Semantics
We will first introduce the team-based logics of interest in this paper, i.e. modal logic with intuitionistic disjunction ML( ), modal dependence logic MDL, and extended modal dependence logic EMDL. We will then show that with respect to frame definability all of these logics coincide. Finally, we will compare these logics to logics extended with the universal modality. We show that surprisingly, with respect to frame definability, ML( u + ) coincides with ML( ). It then follows that ML( u + ) coincides also with MDL and EMDL.
Syntax and Semantics
A subset T of the domain of a Kripke model M is called a team of M. We will next define three variants of modal logic for which the semantics is defined not via pointed Kripke models (M, w) but Kripke models with teams (M, T ). The syntax of modal logic with intuitionistic disjunction ML( )(Φ) is obtained by extending the syntax of ML(Φ) by the grammar rule ϕ ::= (ϕ ϕ). The syntax of modal dependence logic MDL(Φ) and extended modal dependence logic EMDL(Φ) is obtained by extending the syntax of ML(Φ) by the following grammar rule for each n ∈ ω: ϕ ::= dep(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ) , where ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ ∈ ML(Φ).
In the additional grammar rules above for MDL, we require that ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ ∈ Φ. The intuitive meaning of the (modal) dependence atom dep(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ψ) is that the truth value of the formula ψ is completely determined by the truth values of ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n . As before, if the underlying set Φ of atomic propositions is clear from the context, we drop "(Φ)".
Before we define the team semantics for ML( ), MDL, and EMDL, let us first introduce some notation that makes defining the semantics simpler. 
For teams T and S of M, we write T [R]S if S ⊆ R[T ] and T ⊆ R
Thus, T [R]S holds if and only if for every w ∈ T there exists some v ∈ S such that wRv, and for every v ∈ S there exists some w ∈ T such that wRv. We are now ready to define the team semantics for ML( ), MDL, and EMDL. We use the symbol "|=" for team semantics instead of the symbol " " which was used for Kripke semantics.
Definition 10. Let M be a Φ-model and T a team of M. The satisfaction relation M, T |= ϕ for ML( )(Φ), MDL(Φ), and EMDL(Φ) is defined as follows.
For ML( ) we have the following additional clause:
For MDL and EMDL we have the following additional clause:
We say that a formula ϕ of ML( )(Φ) (MDL(Φ) and EMDL(Φ), respectively) is valid in a Φ-model M = (W, R, V ), and write M |= ϕ, if M, T |= ϕ holds for every team T of M. For formulae of ML, the team semantics and the semantics defined via pointed models in the following sense coincide: Proposition 4 ( [18] ). Let M be a Φ-model, T be a team of M, and w a point of M. Then, for every formula ϕ of ML(Φ) M, T |= ϕ ⇔ ∀w ∈ T : M, w ϕ, and especially M, {w} |= ϕ ⇔ M, w ϕ.
From Proposition 4 if follows that for every model M and formula
Proposition 5 (Downwards closure). Let ϕ be a formula of ML( ) or EMDL. Given a model M, and teams S ⊆ T of M: M, T |= ϕ implies M, S |= ϕ.
Definition 11. We say that the formulae ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ∈ L ∈ {ML( ), EMDL} are equivalent (in team semantics), and write ϕ 1 ≡ T ϕ 2 , if for every model M and every team T of M the equivalence M, T |= ϕ 1 ⇔ M, T |= ϕ 2 holds.
Recall the definition of ≡ K from Section 2. When the subscript (K or T ) of ≡ K or ≡ T is clear from the context (or when the two definitions coincide), we omit the subscript and write simply ≡. Note that, by Proposition 4, for ϕ, ψ ∈ ML the equivalence ϕ ≡ K ψ ⇔ ϕ ≡ T ψ holds.
Frame Definability in Team Semantics
Recall the definitions of frame definability from Section 3, and note that the definitions given there apply also to logics with team semantics. In [11] it was shown that the expressive powers of EMDL and ML( ) coincide. From this together with the fact that MDL = F EMDL (see Proposition C.1 in Appendix C), we obtain the following proposition.
Proof. Let F be a frame class. By Proposition 2, it suffices to show that F is ML( )-definable iff it is u ML-definable. "If" and "Only If" parts follow directly from Lemma C.2 and Lemma C.3 (in Appendix C), respectively.
We are finally ready to combine our results concerning frame definability of team-based modal logics and modal logics with the universal modality. By Propositions 2 and 6, and Theorem 4, we obtain the following strict hierarchy.
Moreover, the same holds when we restrict ourselves to the elementary frame classes.
We can now extend our Goldblatt-Thomason -style characterization (i.e., Theorem 3) to cover also the team-based logics MDL, EMDL, and ML( ). Corollary 1. For every logic L ∈ {ML( u + ), MDL, EMDL, ML( )} and for every elementary frame class F, the following are equivalent:
Conclusion
This paper initiated the study of frame definability in the context of teambased modal logics. We identified a connection between modal logics with team semantics and modal logic extended with the universal modality. We showed that, with respect to frame definability, we have the following strict hierarchy:
In addition we gave a Goldblatt-Thomason -style characterization for the frame definability of MDL, EMDL, ML( ), and ML( u + ). We showed that an elementary class of frames is definable in one (all) of those logics if and only if the class is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes.
A Modal logic with universal modality
Proof. (i) and (iii) follow from [10, Proposition 3.6].
(ii) is completely analogous to the item (i).
Proof. The proof is done by induction on ϕ. The cases for literals and connectives are trivial. As for the case ϕ = ψ, we proceed as follows. By induction hypothesis there exists a conjunctive u -form i∈I ψ i , where each ψ i is a disjunctive u -clause, such that i∈I ψ i ≡ K ψ. By the semantics of , we have that ( ψ ≡ K ) i∈I ψ i ≡ K i∈I ψ i . Now since each ψ i is a disjunctive u -clause, it follows from item (i) of Proposition A.1 that, for each i ∈ I, the formula ψ i is equivalent to some disjunctive u -clause ψ i . Thus i∈I ψ i is a conjunctive u -form that is equivalent to ψ.
The proof for the case of u ϕ is otherwise the same as the proof for the case ϕ, but instead of item (i) of Proposition A.1, item (iii) is used. The proof for the case ♦ϕ is likewise analogous to that of ϕ. The proof uses a disjunctive u -form instead of the conjunctive one and item (ii) of Proposition A.1 instead of item (i).
Example A.1. Consider the following examples from [10, p.14]: the formula ¬p ∨ u p defines the class {(W, R) ∈ F all | |W | = 1}, whereas the formula ♦ u ♦(p ∨ ¬p) defines the class {(W, R) ∈ F all | R = ∅}. Clearly, the former is not closed under taking disjoint unions, and the latter is not closed under taking generated subframes. Note that both of the classes above are elementary.
Lemma A.1. For each ML( u + )-formula ϕ, there exists a finite set Γ of closed disjunctive u -clauses such that M ϕ iff M Γ for every model M.
Proof. Let ϕ be an ML( u + )-formula. By Theorem 1, we may assume that ϕ is a conjunctive u -form i∈I ψ i , where each ψ i := γ i ∨ j∈Ji u δ j is a disjunctive u -clause. By Proposition A.1 (iii), for each i ∈ I, u ψ i is equivalent to the closed disjunctive u -clause
Proof. The direction u ML ≤ F ML( u + ) is trivial. We show that ML( u + ) ≤ F u ML. Consider any ML( u + )-definable class of frames F. Let Γ be a set of ML( u + ) formulae that defines F. By Lemma A.1, for each ϕ ∈ Γ , there is a finite set ∆ ϕ of closed disjunctive u -clauses such that M ϕ iff M ∆ ϕ for every Kripke model M. It follows that M Γ iff M ϕ∈Γ ∆ ϕ for every Kripke model M. Therefore, ϕ∈Γ ∆ ϕ also defines F, as desired.
Proposition A.3. Let F be a frame and ϕ a closed disjunctive u -clause. If F ϕ, then G ϕ for all generated subframes G of F.
Proof. Fix any generated subframe G of a frame F and put ϕ := i∈I u ψ i . Suppose that F ϕ. To show G ϕ, fix any valuation V and any state w in G. We show that (G, V ), w u ψ i for some i ∈ I. Since we can regard V as a valuation on F, (F, V ), w i∈I u ψ i . Thus there is some i ∈ I such that (F, V ), u ψ i , for every u ∈ |F|. Fix such i ∈ I. Since ψ i is in ML and the satisfaction of ML is invariant under taking generated submodels (cf. [3, Proposition 2.6]), (G, V ), u ψ i for every u ∈ G. Therefore, (G, V ), w u ψ i , as desired.
Proposition A.4. Let F be a frame and ϕ a closed disjunctive u -clause. If G ϕ for all finitely generated subframes G of F, then F ϕ.
Proof. We show the contrapositive implication. Let ϕ be i∈I u ψ i and suppose that F i∈I u ψ i . Now, we can find a valuation V and a state w such that (F, V ), w u ψ i for all i ∈ I. Thus, for each i ∈ I, there is a state w i such that (F, V ), w i ψ i . Define X := { w i | i ∈ I } and note that X is finite. Consider the submodel (F X , V X ) of F generated by X. Since for each i ∈ I, (F, V ), w i ψ i and ψ i ∈ ML, and since the satisfaction of ML is invariant under generated submodels (cf. [3, Proposition 2.6]), it follows that (F X , V X ), w i ψ i for each i ∈ I. Thus (F X , V X ) u ψ i for each i ∈ I. Hence (F X , V X ) i∈I u ψ i , which implies our goal F X i∈I u ψ i .
B Goldblatt-Thomason Theorem
Definition B.1 (Satisfiability). Let Γ be a set of formulae, M a model and F a class of frames. We say that Γ is satisfiable in M if there exists a point w of M such that M, w γ for all γ ∈ Γ . We say that Γ is finitely satisfiable in M if each finite subset of Γ is satisfiable in M. We say that Γ is satisfiable in F if there exists a frame F ∈ F and a valuation V on F such that Γ is satisfiable in (F, V ) . Finally, we say that Γ is finitely satisfiable in F if each finite subset of Γ is satisfiable in F.
Theorem B.1. Given any elementary frame class F, the following are equivalent:
Proof. The direction from (i) to (ii) follows directly by Propositions 1 and 3, and Theorem 2. In the proof of the converse direction, we use some notions from first-order model theory such as elementary extensions and ω-saturation. The reader unfamiliar with them is referred to [5] . Assume (ii) and define Log(F) := ϕ ∈ ML( u + ) | F ϕ . We show that, for any frame F, F ∈ F iff F Log(F).
Consider any F = (W, R). It is trivial to show the Only-If-direction, and so we show the If-direction. Assume that F Log(F). To show F ∈ F, we may assume, without loss of generality, that F is finitely generated. This is because: otherwise, it would suffice to show, since F reflects finitely generated subframes, that G ∈ F for all finitely generated subframes G of F. Let U be a finite generator of F. Let us expand our syntax with a (possibly uncountable) set { p A | A ⊆ W } of new propositional variables and define ∆ to be the set containing exactly:
where A, B ⊆ W and m R (A) := { x ∈ W | xRy for some y ∈ A }. Define
for each u ∈ U . Note that all formulae in ∆ F are ML( u )-formulae and that each formula in ∆ F,u belong to ML. Recall that F is finitely generated by U . The intuition here is that ∆ F provides a "complete enough description" of F.
We will now show that ∆ F is satisfiable in F. Since F is elementary, it follows from the compactness of first-order logic that it suffices to show that ∆ F is finitely satisfiable in F. Let Γ be a finite subset of ∆ F and write Γ := ♦ u γ 1 , . . . , ♦ u γ n .
We note that each γ i belongs to ML. Assume, for the sake of a contradiction, that F ¬ 1≤i≤n ♦ u γ i . Now clearly F ϑ, where ϑ := 1≤i≤n u ¬γ i . Since ϑ is an ML( u + )-formula, it belongs to Log(F). Thus by the assumption F Log(F), we conclude that F ϑ, and therefore F ¬ 1≤i≤n ♦ u γ i . However, Γ is clearly satisfiable in F under the natural valuation sending p A to A, which implies F ¬ Γ . This is a contradiction. Therefore, ∆ F is satisfiable in F. Let H ∈ F be such that ∆ F is satisfiable in H. Let us fix a valuation V such that (H, V ) ∆ F . Let (H * , V * ) be some ω-saturated elementary extension of (H, V ). Clearly also (H * , V * ) ∆ F . It then follows that, for each u ∈ U , ∆ F,u is finitely satisfiable in (H * , V * ). Thus, by ω-saturatedness, ∆ F,u is satisfiable in (H * , V * ) for each u ∈ U . For each u ∈ U , let w u denote a point such that (H * , V * ), w u ∆ F,u . Define Z := {w u | u ∈ U }. Now let (G * Z , V * Z ) denote some ω-saturated elementary extension of the Z generated submodel of (H * , V * ). It is easy to check that (G * Z , V * Z ) ∆ F and (G * Z , V * Z ) ∆. Since F is elementary and closed under taking generated subframes, we conclude first that H * ∈ F and then that G * Z ∈ F. We can now prove the following claim. Claim. The ultrafilter extension ueF is a bounded morphic image of G * Z . By closure of F under bounded morphic images, we oftain ueF ∈ F. Finally, since F reflects ultrafilter extensions, F ∈ F, as required. It is now straightforward to show that the claim follows.
Definition C.1. We say that an ML( )-formula ϕ is in -normal form if ϕ = ψ 1 ψ 2 . . . ψ n for some n ∈ ω and ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ n ∈ ML(Φ).
Proposition C.2 ( -normal form, [19, 21] ). For every ML( )-formula ϕ there exists an equivalent formula in -normal form.
Lemma C.1. For every ML-formula ϕ and model M: M u ϕ iff M, W |= ϕ.
Proof. By the semantics of u , M u ϕ iff M, w ϕ for every w ∈ W . Furthermore by Proposition 4, M, w ϕ for every w ∈ W iff M, W |= ϕ.
Lemma C.2. For every ML( )-formula ϕ there exists a closed disjunctive uclause ϕ − such that M |= ϕ iff M ϕ − for every Kripke model M.
Proof. Let ϕ be an arbitrary ML( )-formula. By Proposition C.2, we may assume that ϕ = ψ 1 · · · ψ n , for some n ∈ ω and ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ∈ ML. Let M = (W, R, V ) be an arbitrary model. It suffices to show M |= ϕ ⇔ M u ψ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ u ψ n . This is shown as follows.
M |= ϕ Lemma C.3. For every closed disjunctive u -clause ϕ ∈ ML( u + ) there exists an ML( )-formula ϕ * such that M ϕ iff M |= ϕ * for every Kripke model M.
Proof. Let ϕ be an arbitrary closed disjunctive u -clause, i.e., ϕ = u ψ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ u ψ n for some n ∈ ω and ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ∈ ML. Let M = (W, R, V ) be an arbitrary Kripke model. It suffices to show M ϕ ⇔ M |= ψ 1 · · · ψ n . We proceed as follows. 
